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We analyze the fundamental security significance of the quantitative criteria on the final generated
key K in quantum key generation including the quantum criterion d, the attacker’s mutual informa-
tion on K, and the statistical distance between her distribution on K and the uniform distribution.
For operational significance a criterion has to produce guarantee on the attacker’s probability of
correctly estimating some portions of K from her measurement, in particular her maximum proba-
bility of identifying the whole K. We distinguish between the raw security of K when the attacker
just gets at K before it is used in a cryptographic context and its composition security when the
attacker may gain further information during its actual use to help getting at K. We compare both
of these securities of K to those obtainable from conventional key expansion with a symmetric key
cipher. It is pointed out that a common belief in the superior security of a quantum generated K is
based on an incorrect interpretation of d which cannot be true, and the security significance of d is
uncertain. Generally, the QKD key K has no composition security guarantee and its raw security
guarantee from concrete protocols is worse than that of conventional ciphers. Furthermore, for both
raw and composition security there is an exponential catch up problem that would make it difficult
to quantitatively improve the security of K in a realistic protocol. Some possible ways to deal with
the situation are suggested.
PACS numbers: 03.67.Dd
I. Introduction And Summary
Physical cryptography, the use of physical effects in
addition to purely mathematical artifice for fast reliable
cryptographic functions, has received considerable recent
attention. For key generation, variously called key distri-
bution, key expansion, key exchange or key agreement,
the use of classical noise was first proposed [1]-[3] while
the use of information-disturbance tradeoff in BB84 type
protocols are the well known quantum key distribution
(QKD) schemes [4]-[5]. Other quantum schemes that
dispense with intrusion level estimation have been de-
veloped on the basis of incompatible quantum measure-
ments in the KCQ (keyed communication in quantum
noise) approach [6]-[9]. The fundamental merit of these
physical cryptographic schemes is that the so-called in-
formation theoretic (IT) security is possible, in contrast
to the expansion of a master key to session keys or key
agreement from public-key protocols with security based
on computational complexity. It is the purpose of this pa-
per to demonstrate in detail that, contrary to widespread
perception and belief, (i) it is not clear how strong IT se-
curity can even be obtained in principle from QKD; (ii)
the security guarantee that can be experimentally ob-
tained thus far is quite inadequate. Some assessment and
suggestion will be made on the current situation. Note
that we are not at all concerned with appropriate sys-
tem modeling or device imperfection issues, but rather
just with the fundamental quantitatively achievable se-
curity in a concrete protocol with realistic parameters,
assuming perfect devices and applicable system model.
There are two main reasons for this present unsatis-
factory state of affairs: The problem of quantitative se-
curity criteria and the security of the final generated key
K during actual use in a cryptography scheme — the
so-called composability problem. We will explain them
by comparing a perfect fresh key Kp and a session key
K ′ generated from a pseudorandom number generator
(PRNG) to the key K generated from BB84 type proto-
cols [10]. The comparison between K ′ and K is meaning-
ful because a shared secret key between the users is also
needed in KCQ, and in QKD for message authentication,
during the key generation process. The keys obtainable
from KCQ or classical noise-based protocols would share
all or some of the problems associated with K.
A perfect key Kp has a uniform probability distribu-
tion p(Kp) = U to the attacker (Eve). For Kp consist-
ing of n bits, there are 2n possible values for Kp each
with a probability Ui = 2
−n. Furthermore, any piece
of additional information Eve may obtain in the actual
use of Kp in any cryptographic scheme should not give
Eve more information about Kp. For example, when Kp
is used in one-time pad encryption of some n data bits
and m < n bits are revealed in a known-plaintext attack
(KPA), Eve still would have a uniform distribution with
respect to the remaining n−m bits in Kp. We would call
the pre-use quantitative security of K its “raw security”
and the in-use security its “composition security”. Com-
position security guarantee is needed even when the raw
security is adequate. In this paper we would deal with
composition security mainly on the problem of the extent
any bit of K remains secret when some other part of K
2is known to Eve. For such problem whether K is perfect
for a classical protocol reduces to the question whether
p(K) = U, where p(K) is Eve’s probability distribution
on K obtained through her attack with possible further
information gained during the actual use of K. The situ-
ation is far more complicated in the quantum case due to
the possibility of quantum memory. It is possible to ob-
tain a perfect key in practice when a secure method (but
perhaps clumsy such as hand delivery) is used to deliver
a randomly picked key string to be shared between two
users Alice and Bob. If one generates the key by a public-
key technique such as RSA, its security is based entirely
on (presumed) computational complexity, i.e., it is (pre-
sumably) practically impossible for Eve to determine K
due to the lack of an efficient algorithm even though it
is possible in principle. In contrast, Kp has IT security
that is not changed by Eve’s computational power.
One often hears that the generated key K in QKD
has IT security, by itself a rather misleading statement
because the K obtained in physical cryptography is never
perfect just in the sense of p(K) = U . A mistaken claim
is maintained in the literature[5],[11]-[12] that p(K) =
U with a high probability if one uses the criterion d to
be discussed later. It is one of the main purposes of
this paper to dispel this misconception. In contrast to a
QKD generated key K, a fresh key when available can
typically be taken to be perfect in standard cryptography
as indicated above. A more precise security claim on
K is that it is sufficiently close to perfect. But then
the crucial issue of quantitative security criteria arises
for measuring the closeness, and in particular why any
specific achievable quantitative value is adequately secure
in a given application. This problem does not arise in a
standard fresh key for which p(K) = U .
There is no fundamental guarantee of IT security from
“randomness test” given Eve’s knowledge of the key gen-
eration process. The proper security criterion onK is the
set of probabilities p(K˜) of Eve’s correct estimates on all
the possible subsets K˜ of K which she could derive from
her possible p(K). Common single-number criterion such
as her mutual information on K has no empirical opera-
tional security significance in itself and merely expresses a
constraint on Eve’s possible p(K). For operational guar-
antee one would need to translate such a criterion into
guarantees on p(K˜) which would be carried out in this
paper.
To avoid possible confusion one may distinguish the
following three different logical situations:
(a) A proof of security has been obtained that works
against all possible attacks with high probability.
(b) A specific attack has been found that breaches se-
curity with high probability.
(c) Security level unknown for various possible attacks.
In this paper we are not talking about case (b). Instead,
it is pointed out that case (a) has not been established
and case (c) is the current situation contrary to the claims
in the QKD literature.
For comparison to the case of K, we first describe the
raw and composition security for the key K ′ obtained
by PRNG in standard (conventional) cryptography. In
typical ”key expansion” scheme a master key Km is fed
through a PRNG to generate a key K ′ with many more
bits that Km, |Km| < |K ′|. Different segments of K ′ are
then used as different session keys in various uses in order
to reduce the total number of perfect key bits otherwise
needed. On the raw security of K ′, the Shannon measure
of information or Eve’s entropy on K ′, HE (K
′), is often
employed. The well known Shannon limit [3],[9],[13]-[14]
says
HE (K
′) 6 |Km| (1)
If K˜ ′ is any subset (subsequence) ofK ′, it is possible that
HE(K˜
′) = |K˜ ′| similar to the case of a uniform K˜ ′ even
under (1) when |K˜ ′| ≤ |Km|, but no other K˜ ′ can have a
uniform distribution since that would violate (1). Thus,
with HE(K
′) taken as the measure of raw security, there
is IT security for such session keys in standard cryptog-
raphy also. It is just that their quantitative level may be
far from perfect.
There are other important measures of quantitative IT
security: Eve’s maximum probability p1(K) of determin-
ing the whole keyK, her maximum probabilities p1(K˜) of
determining various subsets K˜ or K, and these are the
ones with operational significance. In addition to HE ,
there is another common single-number measure used in
quantifying the randomness of a bit sequence, namely the
statistical distance δ(p(K), U) ≡ δE(K) between Eve’s
probability distribution of K and U . Generally, from dif-
ferent attacks on a physical cryptosystem and from dif-
ferent measured ciphertexts, Eve would obtain different
probability distribution p(K) on K, which would deter-
mine the above quantities and whatever other measure
one may employ. The significant point and a main diffi-
culty is that no single number, be it HE , p1 or δE , could
capture the full security picture in physical key genera-
tion with even just one probability distribution p(K) for
Eve.
For raw security, many PRNG including those given
just by a (maximum length) linear feedback shift regis-
trar (LFSR) with perfect seedkey Km has the following
behavior [15],
p1(K
′) = 2−|K
m|, p1(K˜
′) = 2−|K˜
′| (2)
where K˜ ′ is a subsequence of K ′ up to |Km| consecutive
bits. This is very favorable compared to the K that can
be generated by QKD as will be seen in the next para-
graph. However, suchK ′ has no IT composition security.
Specifically, ifK ′ is used in ”one-time pad” form, i.e., the
PRNG is used as an additive stream cipher with K ′ as
running key, then a KPA with |Km| known consecutive
3data bits would lead to a unique determination of Km
for the usual nondegenerate ciphers including LFSRs in
their common cipher configurations. The knowledge of
Km would then allow the complete determination of K ′
[14]-[15]. The situation is similar when Kp is used in a
conventional symmetric-key block cipher such as AES.
For K obtained from QKD, the most commonly used
criterion for raw security is IE/|K| = 1 − HE(K)/|K|,
Eve’s information per bit on K from her attack. Under
the quantitative security IE/|K| ≤ 2
−l , it was shown
[9, section IIIB] the possibility is not ruled out that Eve
may obtain a correct estimate of K and m-bits subsets
K˜ of K with probabilities, for l < |K|,
p1(K) ∼ 2
−l, p1(K˜
′) ∼
n
m
2−l (3)
Such possibility arises because the bits in K are not sta-
tistically independent to Eve. In BB84 they have been
correlated from error correction and privacy amplifica-
tion as well as from Eve’s joint attack. For concrete pro-
tocols that can be experimentally developed thus far [16],
l ∼ 10 for |K| > 103 which means a disastrous breach of
security with p1(K) ∼ 10
−3 is not ruled out. In any
event, even l ∼ 50 is rather unfavorable compared to (2)
where |Km| > 100 is typical in most conventional ciphers.
Another useful criterion is the statistical distance
δE(K) between p(K) and U . For δE(K) = 2
−l with
l ≤ |K|, the possibility remains that [9, App. B]
p1(K) ∼ 2
−l, p1(K˜) ∼ 2
−l (4)
It should be noted that a sufficiently small p1(K) guaran-
tee is evidently necessary for meaningful security guar-
antee, see Section IV. It is apparent from (3)-(4) that
according to the criterion IE/|K| ≤ ǫ and δE ≤ ǫ, K
is only nearly uniform when ǫ = 2−λ|K| with λ ∼ 1, a
condition that appears impossible to achieve by a real-
istic protocol with a significant key generation rate. For
the criterion IE/|K|, QKD does much better than PRNG
which is responsible for the better composition security
of K as will be shown in this paper.
On the composition security of K it has been shown
[12] that when Eve retains her probe, for IE/|K| ∼ 2
−l
it may be possible for her to tell the (l + 1)th bit of K
knowing l of them from, say, a KPA on the of use of K
as one-time pad. To overcome this problem, the use of a
different criterion d,
d ≡
1
2
‖ρKE − ρU ⊗ ρE‖1 ≤ ǫ (5)
was suggested and developed [11], [17]. The claim is that
under (5) the users would get a perfect key K with prob-
ability at least 1 − ǫ. This is an incorrect interpretation
of (5) as has been mentioned [9, App. B]. Given this pre-
vailing misconception we will give a detailed discussion
in section IIIC and bring out the point instead that p(K)
is actually never given by U for d = ǫ > 0 and that d ≤ ǫ
has no clear raw or composition security significance. In
any event, theoretical estimates [18]-[19] give ǫ = 10−5
for various large |K|, corresponding at best to (4) with
l ∼ 17.
As will be detailed in the paper, the following prob-
lem situation obtains on the security guarantee of the
generated key K in concrete QKD protocols:
(i) The raw security ofK is worse than that of a LFSR
for the probabilities p1(K) of identify the whole K
by an attacker and p1(K˜) for many smaller subsets
K˜ of K.
(ii) There is no composition security guarantee for K;
an exponential decrease of the accessible informa-
tion may only lead to a linear decrease of the num-
ber of compromised key bits while the situation is
unknown for δE or d.
In the following we will flesh out these points and dis-
cuss their implications on the development of physical
cryptography. In section II we will discuss the raw se-
curity of the generated key K. In section III the com-
position security of K will be treated which shows the
lack of such guarantee thus far for both specific attack
scenarios and in general. In Section IV we discuss the
relevance of rigorous security proofs and the importance
of actual numerical values. Some suggestions on possible
future development of physical cryptography is outlined
in section V.
II. RAW SECURITY OF THE GENERATED KEY
We will first review the raw security of a running key
K ′ generated from a master key in standard cryptogra-
phy for later comparison with the key generated from
QKD. Recall that by the raw security of K we mean the
quantitative security level ofK against attacks during the
key generation process without any additional informa-
tion that Eve may obtain during its actual cryptographic
use. For a key obtained from public-key technique such
as RSA, there is no IT security at all since the key can
be determined by Eve if she has sufficient computational
power. Thus, we would not further discuss public-key
schemes in this paper which deals only with IT security.
For the usual symmetric-key ciphers there is IT security
forK ′ and it is better than that of concrete realistic QKD
schemes. As we shall see, this arises as a result of the de-
tailed quantitative behavior of the security measures that
have been adopted to describe the quantitative security.
We will begin with a discussion of the security measures.
IIA. Security Criterion and Security Parameter
The attacker’s optimal probabilities p1(K˜) of correctly
estimating K˜, any subset of K, constitute the opera-
tionally meaningful criterion on the security of K. In
conventional cryptography the closeness of p1(K˜) with
4p1(K˜
p) for all K˜ is called semantic security [20], whether
polynomial complexity is included [21] on an attack algo-
rithm or not [22]. A security parameter ǫ may be intro-
duced to measure the deviation of such semantic security
from a perfect key Kp, ǫ = 0 corresponding to the perfect
case.
Such semantic security guarantee is difficult to obtain
and to prove. Simpler criterion is often employed in-
stead. However, theoretical constructs such as the at-
tacker’s mutual information IE(K) on K has no opera-
tional meaning by itself. In the context of communica-
tions, these information theoretic quantities derive their
empirical significance via the Shannon Coding Theorems
through which they are related to operational quantities
[23]. In the context of cryptography, operational signifi-
cance could only be obtained from the security guarantee
on the various p1(K˜) implied by such single-number cri-
terion. This is what we would spell out in this paper for
the common criteria IE(K)/|K| and δE .
IIB. Conventional Key Expansion Raw IT Security
Consider the running key K ′ generated from a PRNG
with master key Km , with number of bits |K ′| > |Km|.
Segments of |K ′| could be used as session keys in dif-
ferent applications. It can also be used as a running
key, i.e., in one-time pad form as an additive stream ci-
pher. Let Xn be the n-bit data random variable, we use
lower case xn to denote a specific n-sequence from Xn.
An additive stream cipher would have output Yn with
yn = xn ⊕ kn, where kn is a specific value of the n-bit
K ′n. (We add the subscript n on occasion for clarity.)
The general Shannon limit for a standard cipher is given
by (1). It holds for any cipher that satisfies unique de-
cryption H(Xn|Yn,K
m) = 0, thus covers also ‘random
ciphers’ with randomized encryption [13]-[14].
To derive (1) the so-called Kerckhoff’s assumption [14]
is sometimes invoked which says Eve knows everything
about the cipher except the seedkey Km. Such an as-
sumption is not actually needed so long as all the in-
formation Alice and Bob need to share but which Eve
does not have can be quantified by a proper key Km.
The ciphertext Yn is also assumed to be available to Eve,
evidently a most common situation in reality.
We will discuss several quantitative criteria of secu-
rity. First Eve has only one probability distribution on
the possible K ′n for nonrandom nondegenerate ciphers.
All standard ciphers are nonrandom, i.e., one for which
the ciphertext yn is uniquely determined by xn and the
specific km used. From her knowledge on the structure
of a nonrandom cipher Eve could generate the at most
2|K
m| possible sequences of K ′n for any n and determine
its probability distribution. For p(Km) = U , each of
these K ′n - sequence would have the same probability
2−|K
m| under the normal nondegeneracy assumption of
exactly 2|K
m| number of K ′ sequences. The case of ran-
dom ciphers is covered in section IIC that treats classical
noise and QKD generated keys.
From p(K ′n) one can determine Eve’s maximum prob-
ability p1(K
′
n) of getting the whole K
′
n correctly, which
is just 2−|K
m| in the above typical situation. From (1)
Eve’s mutual information per bit on K ′n is at least
IE(K
′
n)/n ≥ 1−H(K
m
n )/n (6)
The δE(K
′
n) is also large for typical n≫ |K
m| similar to
IE(K
′
n)/n. For a maximum length LFSR or more gen-
erally nondegenerate ciphers, the probability of various
consecutive subsequences K˜ ′ of K ′n with |K
′
n| < |K
m| is
given by p1(K˜
′) = 2−|K˜
′| since such K˜ ′ is uniformly dis-
tributed. Thus we have arrived at (2) in section I. How-
ever, different subsequences of K ′ are correlated through
Km and no overall joint probability on any subset of K˜ ′
can be smaller than 2−|K
m|.
It is clear from this description what the mechanism of
the Shannon limit (1) is: however longXn is for n > |K
m|
, from Yn there are at most 2
|Km| possible Xn sequences
from xn = yn⊕kn or any injective encryption map. Such
a cipher is considered adequate in standard cryptogra-
phy for the protection of long data Xn although it is far
from semantically secure, perhaps partly because there
is no alternative that does better information theoreti-
cally than what the key size |Km| allows which is always
far less than n = |Xn| . Perhaps it is partly due to (2),
and partly due to the practical complexity of p(K˜ ′) eval-
uation of more general subsets K˜ ′. But see [20, section
5.5.3].
IIC. QKD Key Raw Security
The case of classical noise key generation will be de-
scribed first. In such cryptosystem where noise is in-
volved including randomized encryption systems, there is
no longer a fixed observation random variable Y En for Eve
in contrast to the case of the previous section on standard
ciphers. In any key generation scheme, the user Alice
picks a random bit sequence Zn′ of length n
′ and trans-
mits it to Bob via modulated physical channel inputs,
who could extract an error free (with high probability)
bit sequenceWn′′ of length n
′′ ≤ n′ from his observation.
For example, this can be done with an openly known er-
ror correcting code (ECC) so that both Alice and Bob
know what Wn′′ is. Then a “privacy amplification” (PA)
function fPA is applied by both to obtain the n bit gen-
erated key Kn = fPA(Wn′′ (Zn′)), n < n
′′. One can com-
bine the ECC and PA, to write Kn = F (Zn′) for an
openly known function F . Eve learns about Kn through
an attack with some observed random variable Y En′ that
depends on Zn′ via p(Y
E
n′ |Zn′), her probability of getting
various yEn given the possible zn′ . With p(Zn′) = U and
the known ECC and PA, Eve then obtains p(Kn|Y
E
n′ ), to
be called Eve’s conditional probability distribution (CPD)
on her estimate of Kn. Note that a single number secu-
rity criterion is just a constraint on Eve’s possible CPD.
5The generation rate r is usually taken to be r = n/n′,
which is further reduced in BB84 from basis matching.
There is typically one complete Y En′ that Eve may ob-
serve in classical-noise key generation and Y En′ can be
drawn from a continuous alphabet, for example when
p(Y En′ |Zn′) is given by that of an additive noise channel.
On the other hand, in QKD and KCQ different incom-
patible p(Y En′ ) may be obtained from different incompat-
ible quantum measurements, i.e., p(Y En′ ) depends on the
specific attack. In all cases the conditioning on differ-
ent possible observations yEn′ in p(Kn|Y
E
n′ ) is an added
complication that does not exist in standard ciphers.
We first assume that yEn′ is fixed and order the result-
ing p
(
kn|y
E
n′
)
≡ pi for i ∈ {1, . . . , N = 2
n} ≡ 1−N ,
p1 ≥ p2 . . . ≥ pN .
The most common quantitative security criterion in
classical-noise and QKD key generation is that Eve’s mu-
tual information per bit IE(Kn)/n must be small, which
cannot be satisfied in standard cipher key expansion from
(6). The question is: how small is small enough for
what security? Note that this question does not arise
for the fresh keys in standard cryptography where the
IT security can be presumed perfect. It is clear that
Eve’s maximum probability of getting the whole key
Kn must be sufficiently small. With the distribution
p1, p2 = ... = pn = (1 − p1)/(N − 1), it has been shown
that [9, Section IIIB ]
Theorem 1:
For IE/n ≤ 2
−l, there are CPD that give
p1 ≥ 2
−l − 1
n2n
.
Furthermore, there are CPD [9] that gives p(K˜m) ∼
n
m
p1
when p1 >> 1/N for m-bit subsets K˜m of K,m < n.
Together these give the quantitative results (3), which
gives the operational significance of a IE/n guarantee.
In many QKD security proofs Eve’s possible IE/n is
bounded for any possible attack she may launch. What-
ever one’s notion of “secure enough” may be in a realistic
application, the experimental results thus far [16] that
yields at best l ∼ 10 for n > 1, 000 is very inadequate
as a security guarantee, because it does not rule out the
large chance 10−3 of identifying the whole 1, 000 bit key
with high probability. See section IVA for a discussion
on the role of security proof in this connection. Thus,
bounding IE/n insufficiently just leaves open the possi-
bility of a disastrous breach of security. This situation
cannot be expected to improve significantly in concrete
realistic protocols because from Theorem 1, decreasing
the security parameter IE/n exponentially only leads to
linear increase in the effective number of random bits
given by l. In this connection, it may be observed that it
is misleading to consider “exponentially small” as quan-
titatively adequate in key generation. See section IV.
In the above p1 for a given CPD we have suppressed
the yEn′ dependence. The common criteria IE/n and δE
are averages over all possible yEn′ for any given attack.
As guarantee for each yEn′ , the Markov inequality [24] for
a negative-valued random variable X would need to be
employed,
Pr[X ≥ ǫ] ≤ E[X ]/ǫ (7)
where E[X ] is the average value of X . Generally this
would lead to the more stringent requirement from an
E[X ] < ǫ to E[X ] < ǫ2 to guarantee X < ǫ with prob-
ability > 1 − ǫ, the latter probability requirement is es-
pecially appropriate when X is essentially a probability
itself. Thus, by taking IE/n ∼ p1 from (2) the actual full
guarantee would reduce the exponent l by 1
2
, making it so
much more difficult to achieve a good value in practice.
The criterion of statistical distance (L1-distance, vari-
ational distance, Kolmogorov distance) δE ≡ δ(P,U) be-
tween Eve’s CPD P = {pi} and the uniform U can be
used,
δ(P,U) =
1
2
N∑
i=1
∣∣∣∣pi −
1
N
∣∣∣∣ (8)
It is a direct consequence of the definition (8) that [24,
p.299]
δE ≤ ǫ =⇒ p(K˜m) ≤ ǫ+
1
2m
(9)
where K˜m is any m-bit subset of Kn. As a numerical
measure, δE suffers exactly the same p1 problem as IE/n.
From the same distribution that gives Theorem 1 for p1 =
2−l, one obtains [9, App B],
Theorem 2:
For δE = 2
−l, there are CPD that give p1 = 2
−l + 1
N
.
Similar constructions give (9) with ≤ replaced by =,
thus yielding (4) above. Note that (9) gives the oper-
ational significance of a δE guarantee. From Theorems
1 and 2 it follows that K is only nearly uniform when
l ∼ |K|. It appears there is no experimental protocol that
has been quantified with δE or d. Theoretical estimates
thus far concentrate on ǫ = 10−5 for d ≤ ǫ with various
large n [18]-[19]. Even without using (7) for individual
guarantee such p1 is inadequate for many purposes. In
particular, it is questionable to say a 105 bit key K has
IT security with just l ∼ 17 as compared to the l ∼ 105
for a really perfect key.
The raw security significance of d ≤ ǫ is unknown as
shown in the next subsection. Thus, while QKD may in
principle provide better p1(K) guarantee than conven-
tional key expansion it is much worse in practice and
unlikely to significantly improve. This is because it is
difficult to capture the possible probability distribution
behavior with a mere single parameter value. A good p1
guarantee, by itself or through IE/n or δE , is inadequate
unless p1 = 2
−l with l ∼ n. This exponential-linear prob-
lem appears to be a major quantitative stumbling block
to physical cryptography.
6III. composition security of the generated key
In this section we will show that composition secu-
rity has not been guaranteed at all in QKD under IE/n
or δE and their quantum counterparts. Recall that by
the composition security of K we mean its quantitative
security level against attacks that utilize information ob-
tained both during the key generation process and during
the actual cryptogaphic use of K. We will discuss only a
specific composition security scenario of partial key leak-
age (PKL) —whether it is possible for Eve to predict a
future bit exactly if part of K is known to her.
IIIA. Conventional Cipher Composition Security
We first review the case of a standard nonrandom ci-
pher, for which the raw security of K ′ was discussed in
section IIB. For an additive stream cipher yn = xn ⊕ kn
where kn is a specific value ofK
′
n with distribution p(K
′)
on 1−N , Eve would learn m bits of kn from a KPA
where she knows m < n bits of xn and the openly ob-
served value of yn. From these m bits of kn Eve could
try to determine the seedkey Km to whatever degree pos-
sible and with such knowledge on Km she could then get
information on the other n − m bits in xn through yn.
Such KPA can often be launched in real world situations.
It is convenient to assume the m known bits of xn are
its first m bits. For the situation where Eve knows noth-
ing about xn, i.e., p(Xn) = U , the key K
′ and hence
Km is totally hidden from observation of Yn alone since
p(kn|yn) becomes a memoryless binary symmetric chan-
nel with crossover probability 1/2. That does not mean,
of course, that the security of Xn is good enough as sec-
tion IIB shows how it is limited by (1). It is possible that
Eve knows something aboutXn so that to her p(Xn) 6= U
but she does not know any bit in xn for sure. We will
not discuss such scenario of “statistical attack” [13],[14]
in this paper and focus on just KPA.
For nondegenerate nonrandom ciphers [13],[14]
there is a one-to-one mapping between Km and
{(Xm′ , Ym′)|m
′ ∈ 1− |Km|}, the pairs of |Km| consecu-
tive data bits in Xn and the corresponding output bits in
Yn. This includes block ciphers and their stream cipher
modes of operation. Thus, in a KPA with m = |Km|
the key Km can be uniquely determined and the rest
n − m bits in Xn are totally compromised information
theoretically. This is the situation in conventional
symmetric-key ciphers such as AES where security
depends exclusively on the complexity of finding Km
from {(Xm′ , Ym′)}. Indeed, such weak composition
security is a manifestation of the weak IE/n raw security
from the Shannon Limit (6). As will be seen in the next
subsection IIIB, it is removed (classically) by a strong
IT guarantee on the raw security. Thus, the composition
security situation of classical key expansion is similar to
both the raw and composition security of asymmetrical
key ciphers such as RSA whose security depends on the
complexity of factoring large integers.
Generally, we have the PKL problem of the extent to
which knowledge on one part of the key K would reveal
about another part, all through the probability distribu-
tion p(K) itself without any further information as in the
case of the above KPA. This problem does not exist for
a key K with p(K) = U , not to mention a perfect key
Kp. The security against PKL cannot be guaranteed by
p1 alone, but it was thought that “exponentially small”
IE/n and δE would be sufficient even in the context of
QKD with Eve holding onto her probe with quantum
memory. In the rest of this section III we will show that is
the case in a purely classical situation but the presence of
quantum effect, while allowing key generation with small
IE/n and δE , also takes away the composition security
guarantee that obtains in a purely classical scenario.
Before proceeding, it may be mentioned that the pos-
sibility of IT security on the key against KPA is not ruled
out for degenerate ciphers, meaningful versions of which
can be developed for classical ciphers with randomized
encryption [13]. That is the subject for future detailed
treatment.
III B. Composition Security Under IE and δE
In this subsection we develop the composition secu-
rity significance of an IE and an δE guarantee on a key
K with distribution p(K) to Eve. This applies to any
classical protocol directly and also to a quantum proto-
col through reduction of the quantum security criterion
guarantee. The quantum case would be handled in the
next subsection.
For a symmetric-key conventional cipher such as AES
under KPA or statistical attack, Eve would obtain in gen-
eral information on p(K) distributed through the whole
K. We consider the specific case where an m-bit subse-
quence Km of an n-bit K is known exactly to Eve, for
example obtained from an m-bit KPA for K used as one-
time pad, and ask whether any other bit in K would be
revealed with a significant probability from such knowl-
edge. It is clear that a p1(K) guarantee does nothing
for this problem unless it is very close to 2−n, because
it applies to just one xn and it says little about corre-
lations among the n bits of K which is the matter of
concern here. On the other hand, since IE and δE are
themselves already constraints on the whole p(K), it may
be expected a sufficiently small value would lead to good
composition security in this case. The question is how
small.
The following result shows that a linear leak of infor-
mation is possible under IE in the absence of any quan-
tum effect.
Theorem 3:
With IE/n = ǫ for any 0 < ǫ ≤ 1 there are p(K) for
which Eve knows one additional bit from knowing ⌈1/ǫ⌉
number of them in an n-bit K. Equivalently, for such
7p(K) a fraction ǫ of the bits of K can be determined
from the rest of K.
The proof can be obtained from the following simple
construction. Let P (kn) = P (k1, ..., kn) = 2
−n for n
bits of an (n + 1)-bit K, and let kn+1 = f(kn) where f
is a known deterministic Boolean function of kn. Then
P (kn+1) = P (kn+1|kn)P (kn) = 2
−n from which it fol-
lows that IE/(n + 1) = 1/(n + 1). Either by extension
to m > 1 other bits determined by kn or by forming a
product distribution, the theorem follows.
Thus under a KPA with IE/n ≤ 2
−l, one bit may be
leaked for every 2l known bits. This is perhaps tolera-
ble in some applications when l ≥ 10, although there is
still the issue of the distribution of such leaked bits in
K. Unfortunately, the quantum situation is much worse
as discussed in subsection IIIC with respect to the corre-
sponding accessible information.
The situation for δE is much more favorable than IE .
It is easy to show by simple counting that no determin-
istic bit of K can be leaked this way when δE < 1/2. It
can be shown that for δE ≤ ǫ Eve could not achieve even
a probability of knowing a bit better than ǫ + 1/2 com-
pared to 1/2 from pure guessing. We will not dwell on
the composition security of a δE classical guarantee with
no quantum probe that has been held in quantum mem-
ory, as it appears entirely adequate. On the other hand,
as will be discussed in the next subsection IIIC there is
no known guarantee in the case when quantum memory
is available for a related quantum criterion d. A contrary
claim has been repeatedly made in the literature [25] in-
cluding a recent broad review of QKD security [5]. The
error in such a claim can be traced to an incorrect infer-
ence on the meaning of the classical statistical distance
to be presently discussed.
It was suggested that between two distributions P,Q
for two random variables X and X ′ over the same range
χ of N elements, the statistical distance
δ(P,Q) ≡
1
2
∑
x∈χ
|P (x)−Q(x)| (10)
“can be interpreted as the probability that two random
experiments described by P and Q respectively, are dif-
ferent” [11],[17] , an interpretation repeated in refs. [12],
[28]. The justification for the interpretation is given by
lemma 1 in refs [11], [28] which states that for any two
distributions P and Q for X and X ′ there exists a joint
distribution PXX′ that gives P,Q as marginals with
Pr[X 6= X ′] = δ(P,Q). (11)
However, to the extent it makes sense to talk about such a
joint distribution, the interpretation would obtain only if
“there exists” is replaced by “for every”. This is because
since there is no knowledge on such joint distribution, one
cannot assume the most favorable case via “there exists”
for security guarantee or for general interpretation. In-
deed, it is not clear at all what realistic meaning can be
given or claimed for the realization of such a joint distri-
bution, other than the independent case PXX′ = P · Q.
This independent case is the appropriate one to consider
since one is just comparing two distributions P and Q
with δ(P,Q). In such case, even if both P and Q are the
same uniform distribution so that δ(P,Q) = 0, we have
Pr[X 6= X ′] = 1− 1
N
and the two sides of (11) are almost
as far apart as it could be since both must be between 0
and 1. This is also a counter-example to the interpreta-
tion. As a matter of fact, whether (11) holds is irrelevant
to how close P and Q are according to δ(P,Q).
Furthermore, instead of (11) the following equation
(12) is a consequence of the interpretation,
P (x) = (1− ǫ)Q(x) + ǫP ′(x) (12)
where P ′ is a probability distribution on χ. Indeed (12)
may be taken as the mathematical representation of the
interpretation, apart from possible “partition ensemble
fallacy” which we would not discuss since there is no
need. However, (12) cannot be true when δ(P,Q) = ǫ
because that occurs if and only if δ(P ′, Q) = 1 which in
turn holds if and only if P ′ and Q are never both nonzero
on the same x. The latter never occurs when χ is taken
to be the common range of P and Q as indicated. Thus,
not only the interpretation is not proven, it has nothing
to do with (11) and cannot even be true. One can also
see this from the immediate fact that P 6= Q for sure
whenever δ(P,Q) = ǫ > 0.
IIIC. Composition Security in QKD and the
Criterion d
In the quantum case Holevo’s bound is often used to
bound the accessible information IE Eve may obtain via
some quantum measurement in the key generation pro-
cess. In the presence of enduring quantum memory, how-
ever, Eve may utilize the bit knowledge she obtained on
parts of K via KPA in conjunction with the quantum
probe still in her possession to get at the rest of K. In
this quantum case there is the additional issue of lock-
able information [12], that a random variable side in-
formation S may reveal to Eve more than H(S) bits of
information on K which is impossible classically. With-
out the quantum probe there would be at most H(S)
bits of classical information which is already reflected in
HE(K) for the PKL problem. In [29], it was suggested
that if Eve’s optimal mutual information on K from a
quantum measurement, called the accessible information
Iacc, is exponentially small in n for large n, then the n-bit
K is composition secure according to their quantitative
definition. While the mathematical result in [29] is cor-
rect, it was pointed out in [12] via a counter-example
with one-time pad use of K that the result does not have
the interpretation given in [29] to guarantee their com-
position security. In particular, it was shown that for
IE/n ∼ 2
−l, each l bits of knowledge on K may yield
another bit. For IE/n ≤ ǫ the fraction of bit leakage
8may thus go up from ǫ to log 1
ǫ
, an exponential increase
from the case where no quantum memory is available.
For l = 10, the possible leak thus increases from 0.1% to
10%.
The following remedy was suggested [11],[17] by using
the criterion (5). Let ρkE be the state in Eve’s possession
conditioned on a generated key value k, and let
ρU ≡
1
|K|
∑
k
|k〉〈k| (13)
be the completely mixed uniform state on the |K| = 2n
orthonormal |k〉’s. It is assumed that the a priori prob-
ability of K to Eve before she measures on her probe is
uniform. Then the security criterion d is the trace dis-
tance
d ≡
1
2
‖ ρKE − ρU ⊗ ρE ‖1 (14)
where
ρKE ≡
1
|K|
∑
k
|k〉〈k| ⊗ ρkE (15)
and
ρE ≡
1
|K|
∑
k
ρkE . (16)
The trace distance ‖ρ−σ‖1 between two states is related
to the classical statistical distance δ(P,Q) between two
probability distributions as follows [11]. For any POVM
or von Neumann measurement made on ρ and σ with
resulting distribution P and Q,
‖ρ− σ‖1 ≤ ǫ =⇒ δ(P,Q) ≤ ǫ (17)
Using (17) and (11) it is concluded [11, p. 414], [17,
Prop 2.1.1] that when d ≤ ǫ the key is ǫ-secure: with
probability p ≥ 1 − ǫ the real and the ideal situation of
perfect security can be considered identical, where the
ideal situation is one where K is replaced by a uniformly
distributed random variable U which is independent of
ρkE . This statement is repeatedly made [25] and provides
the following two very desirable consequences to supply
both raw and composition security significance. Under
d ≤ ǫ, with probability p ≥ 1− ǫ the key K is universally
composable (or at least so for partial key leakage) and
it is the same as the uniform U to Eve for the raw se-
curity apart from composition. Note that similar to the
invalidity of (12), d = ǫ does not imply
ρKE = (1− ǫ)ρU ⊗ ρE + ǫσKE (18)
for some joint density operator σKE . Equation (18) may
lend itself to the above incorrect interpretation. Specific
counter examples and further discussion of (18) can be
found in ref [30].
To see how (5) does not give an ǫ-secure key and how
δE enters, we now trace the steps of the above incorrect
derivation [11]. Let Pky ≡ P (y|k) be Eve’s probability
distribution on her measurement result y conditioned on
an actual generated k, i.e., through ρkE , with Py = P (y)
the distribution obtained through ρE . For d ≤ ǫ, (17) and
(14) imply, with Eve’s a priori distribution on k given by
U,
δ(PkyUk, PyUk) ≤ ǫ (19)
Under the incorrect interpretation, this implies Pky = Py
independent of k with probability ≥ 1 − ǫ, thus Eve’s
corresponding CPD P (k|y) is equal to U also with prob-
ability ≥ 1− ǫ. Not only this conclusion does not follow
unless (11) is true, one can see that P (k|y) 6= U for sure
as long as ρkE or P
k
y carries any k-dependence, i.e., when
there exists k1 6= k2 with P
k1
y 6= P
k2
y for a given y. This
is because Pky then depends on k and thus Eve cannot
have U as her CPD for the given y.
To derive the raw security meaning of d ≤ ǫ, we first
observe that since Bob and Eve perform their “local”
operations separately, the criterion d is exactly equivalent
to
d = Ek[‖ ρ
k
E − ρE ‖1] (20)
and (5) is just a condition on the ρkE . With Ek the
average over the 2n possible values of K, equality of the
right hand sides of (14) and (20) follows from lemma 2 of
ref. [11] directly. The right-hand side of (20) is actually
one of the criteria proposed in [29].
Apart from an increase in ǫ from a Markov inequality
guarantee for individual k, (20) implies
‖ ρkE − ρE ‖1 ≤ ǫ (21)
From (21), (17), and (10) it follows that given n′-bit yEn′ ,
Eve’s CPD P (k|y) satisfies
∣∣P (k|y)− Uk
∣∣ ≤ ǫ · Uk/Py. (22)
The best guarantee from (22) on the smallest P (k|y)
over all possible n′-bit yn′ is Pyn′ = Uyn′ , i.e., the min-
imax of Py over y and Py is obtained by Py = Uy. Ex-
actly similar results are obtained for subsequences ym′
of yn′ corresponding to (9). Thus, (22) would reduce to
δ(P,U) = δE ≤ ǫ when the number of possible y’s is
N . With key sifting, error correction and privacy am-
plification, the number of such possible y is much larger
and so Uk/Py is a very large number that would ren-
der the guarantee (22) useless. Thus, (21)-(22) does not
turn into a useful δE ≤ ǫ guarantee on Eve’s CPD. This
also means (5) implies no composition security guarantee
through δE for the case of no quantum memory.
An ǫ-secure key is evidently “universally composable”
as concluded previously. Since d ≤ ǫ does not imply
9the key is ǫ-secure, the composability problem remains
in the presence of quantum memory. It is yet not known
what the level of PKL leakage may be under the d ≤
ǫ guarantees, whether leakage similar to the accessible
information case is ruled out.
Since δ(P,Q) > 0 implies P 6= Q for sure [31], we have
the following situation
(A) Under d = ǫ, Eve’s probability distribution p(K) is
not the uniform U for sure.
which can be compared to the following claim in the lit-
erature [25]
(A’) Under d = ǫ, Eve’s probability distribution p(K) is
U with probability 1− ǫ.
Note the huge difference between between (A) and (A’),
the latter is currently used to justify the IT security guar-
antee of a QKD key. On the other hand, (A’) is actually
impossible from (A), and the probabilistic or operational
significance of d ≤ ǫ for both the quantitative raw and
composition security are unknown.
IV. Importance of Security Proof and Numerical
Values
Physical cryptography raises new conceptual issues in
addition to the already subtle ones in both conventional
symmetric-key and asymmetric key cryptography. In or-
der to fully assess the significance of the above results
for actual security guarantee, we will discuss some such
conceptual issues in this section.
IVA. Security Proof in Physical Cryptography
We first observe that, in contrast to almost all prob-
lems in physics and most in engineering, a guarantee
of cryptographic security cannot be obtained by exper-
iments which could show a task is well carried out but
not something general is impossible. An experiment can
implement a specific attack and show that it does not
work, but one cannot implement all possible attacks.
All proofs are based on reasoning on specific givens,
in this case the mathematical model of the physical
cryptosystem must be valid for the actual situation if
the proof is to mean what it says in a real applica-
tion. In standard or conventional cryptography where
purely mathematical relations constitute the entire secu-
rity mechanism, there is already a problem on the real-
istic features of an operating cryptosystem that cannot
be incoporated in a general mathematical representation
and must be treated on an individual ad hoc basis, such
as the case of the RSA timing attack. In a physical cryp-
tosystem involving either classical noise sources or quan-
tum effects, the actual mathematical representation is a
major issue due to the presence of other interfering phys-
ical effects that may play a crucial role in the actual cryp-
tographic security. In particular, quantum information is
an unusual area in physics where very small disturbance
can lead to major consequence. In BB84 type QKD there
is a serious problem of system and device modeling at the
time of use, see, e.g., ref [32]-[35], which arises from the
single-photon nature of the signal. In particular, a de-
vice imperfection can entirely compromise the security
of a BB84 protocol [34]-[35]. The issue here is not that
the device imperfection cannot be removed, but rather
how many such undiscovered loopholes there are in prac-
tice. However, in this paper we do not deal with these
issues but only with the fundamental quantitative secu-
rity assuming the physical model is exactly correct.
The excitement of physical cryptography and partic-
ularly QKD is mainly derived from the belief that un-
conditional information-theoretic security is possible for
generating fresh keys which can be proved mathemati-
cally given a model. This is in sharp contrast to con-
ventional cryptography, in which asymmetric key crypto-
system has only complexity based security the strength
of which is further based on unproved though widely ac-
cepted assumptions on the difficulties of various math-
ematical problems. For symmetric-key conventional ci-
phers against KPA, the design is even more of “an art”,
with security based on less widely shared beliefs in the
problem complexity of various attack algorithmss. In
QKD, “unconditional security” means all possibilities of
an attacker gaining more “information” than a designed
level is ruled out except for a small probability which
is itself a design parameter. That is, claim (a) in the
Introduction of this paper is maintained.
In contrast to a perfect key Kp the QKD generated
key K can never be perfect because Eve could always ob-
tain some “information” by an attack during the physical
key generation process. The crucial questions are then
what operational meaning the various security criteria
and proofs have. These questions are already subtle ones
in conventional cryptography, see for example the dispute
described in ref [36] on public-key systems and the com-
plaint on lack of proper security foundation in symmetric-
key ciphers [20]. In physical cryptography such questions
are much more acute while similar security situation has
not arisen previously in any real cipher. These problems
do arise in a more restricted manner (no quantum mem-
ory) in classical-noise key generation which, however, has
never found publicly known actual deployment, and the
criterion of IE/n was employed without any discussion
on its adequacy in cryptographic context [1]-[3].
The various probabilities one can obtain from a math-
ematical model have a clear empirical or operational
meaning, in the same sense that probability in quan-
tum physics or communication engineering has empirical
meaning. However, various theoretical constructs such as
IE and δE do not automatically have the meaning that
would ensure whatever security we may desire in an ap-
plication. They are really no more than mere constraints
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on the possible distribution p(K) Eve may obtain in an
attack and need to be transformed into operational guar-
antees as done in this paper. In particular, it is mislead-
ing to claim that the system is secure if ǫ can be made
exponentially small in |K|, as the following shows.
For example, for a 1,000 bit K, if IE/n . 2
−20 which is
an “exponentially small” number to many, one may thus
claim K is “secure”. From Theorem 1 it is not ruled
out that Eve may identify K with a probability 2−20.
Since IE/n is obtained under average over all possible
key values, from (7) and the surrounding discussion the
final security guarantee then becomes: with a probability
≥ 1−2−10, Eve has IE/n ≤ 2
−10 and thus she may not be
able to get the wholeK from her measurement with prob-
ability more than 2−10. This is a weaker security guar-
antee than the simple statement that for sure Eve could
not get K with probability more than p1 = 2
−10 from
her measurement. Since |K| = 103 >> 10, such guaran-
tee clearly does not rule out with a small enough overall
probability of a disastrous breach of security that Eve
determines the whole K with probability 2−10 ∼ 10−3
from her measurement result alone without any further
use context on K. Even for p1 = 2
−100, one may ask
in what sense such a K is near a perfect 1,000 bit Kp,
particularly in view of all the other subset breach prob-
abilities given in (3).
It is the role of a security proof to rule out such disas-
trous breach of security —— here it is Eve being able to
identify K at a probability p1 ∼ 10
−3 from her measured
result —— by making it very unlikely if not impossible,
certainly not at a probability ∼ 10−3. Security breach
with probability ∼ 10−3 is only a possibility, whether
Eve can actually do it depends on what her distribution
p(K) is, which is obtained via her specific attack that
gives her p(K). A QKD guarantee in terms of accessible
information shows no IE/n can exceed a designed level
ǫ when averaged over specific k. Such guarantee leaves
open the above possibility that cannot be further aver-
aged out — Eve knows her p(K) which is fixed by her
attack. Indeed, the possible large leakage from accessi-
ble information guarantee in composition security when
Eve has quantum memory as given in ref [12] is exactly
the same in this regard— it shows a serious compromise
of security is not ruled out under the security condition
given in [29].
A security proof via δE ≤ ǫ or d ≤ ǫ is exactly of
the same nature, and d ≤ ǫ is adequate only if one uses
the mistaken interpretation (A’) in subsection IIIC in-
stead of the correct (A). Unless IE/n or δE is close to
2−|K|, the QKD generated K is very far from a perfect
Kp while a security proof of d ≤ ǫ has uncertain quan-
titative significance in terms of empirically meaningful
probabilities. We will now discuss the numerical situa-
tion further specifically.
IVB. Actual Quantitative Guarantee
We summarize the status of the quantitative security
guarantee situation in Table 1. Note that d ≤ ǫ is not
listed because it has no clear security significance. The
security parameter is ǫ and smaller ǫ means the system
is more secure. Recall that raw security measures the
information Eve has just from her attack before the key
K is used, and composition security in this case refers
only to the fraction f of deterministic bits that Eve could
get onK from knowing the rest ofK as in a KPA. The K˜
are subsequences of the n-bit K, N = 2n. All the filled
entries in the table other than “f ∼?” are worst case
leaks except for the composition security under IE/n ≤ ǫ.
In that case the leak of f ∼ ǫ would also occur in some
probabalistic form other than deterministic bits of K in
the case of no quantum memory. With quantum memory
f ∼ log 1
ǫ
has not been shown to be the worst scenario. It
is important to observe that the fraction f of bits leaked
can be distributed in any fashion and not just uniformly
in K. Thus, there could be a serious security breach
even when f is very small. This shows the importance of
semantic security.
In current experimental scenarios the final generated
key in a single cycle, or round of QKD after error correc-
tion and privacy amplification, could have |K| in thou-
sands of bits or more. The necessary message authenti-
cation shared secret key Ka that is needed to create a
“public channel” in BB84 type protocols has never been
explicitly integrated into the protocol and accounted for.
It is reasonable to assume |Ka| ∼ 100 for each round
is to be used with one of the current message authenti-
cation code, since |Ka| & 40 is typically used for many
such codes. Compared to the alternative use of Ka as
the seed key Km in a conventional cipher, it is clear that
but for KPA there is little point in using a QKD gener-
ated K from the viewpoint of security guarantee. When
the input data can be assumed uniformly random to Eve,
such conventional cipher K ′ would give better protection
than the QKD keys that can readily be generated in the
foreseeable future. This is evident from the fact that
even without taking (7) into account, the best current
IE/n ∼ 2
−10[16] and δE or d has apparently not been
used in an actual experimental system while theoretical
estimates give d = 10−5 ∼ 2−17 [18]-[19]. In all these
cases n is 103 or much larger. In the literature such nu-
merical evaluation was never compared to the benchmark
of a perfect Kp.
One main problem in this connection is that almost
every relevant quantity is “expontentially small” here. If
one takes that to mean 2−λn, 0 < λ ≤ 1, and |K| =
n, it all depends on how large λ is. Indeed n is not
“asymptotic” either in a real protocol. Thus, the actual
security depends on the precise numerical values of the
system parameter and one cannot capture the situation
by a vague qualitative remark. Other than p1(K) for
identifying the whole K, under (5) for ǫ = 2−l any large
subset K˜ ′ of K may still be determined with a much
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Criteria p1(K) ≤ ǫ IE/n ≤ ǫ δE ≤ ǫ
Raw Security
leak of K p1(K) ∼ ǫ, p1(K) = ǫ+
1
N
,
with probability ǫ p1(K˜) ∼
|K|
|K˜|
ǫ p1(K˜) = ǫ +
1
2
|K˜|
Composition no quantum
f ∼ 1− ǫ f ∼ ǫ f ∼ 0
Security —— memory
fraction f of K with quantum
f ≥ 1− ǫ f ≥ log 1
ǫ
f ∼?
revealed in PKL memory
TABLE I: Quantitative Security in QKD
larger probability 2−l than the uniform |K˜| one of 2−|K˜|.
It is clear that the incorrect statement (A’) in section
IIIC is sorely needed for good security guarantee, but (A)
shows in a strong way that (A’) is forever unachievable.
V Conclusion and Outlook
In this paper we have seen that realistic QKD gener-
ated keys have inadequate raw security and no compo-
sition security guarantee. One may obtain much better
raw security probability guarantee with conventional ci-
phers. The perception to the contrary is due mainly to
a mistaken interpretation of the security criterion d ≤ ǫ,
which has actually no clear operational security signifi-
cance. One may view the logical/historical development
on the information theoretic security of the generated key
as follows. The Shannon limit on conventional key expan-
sion leads to very poor composition security under known
plaintext attack. This composition security predicament
is rectified by QKD via the mutual information criterion
when the attacker does not possess good quantum mem-
ory, but the problem remains when she does. At the same
time the raw security guarantee worsens in concrete QKD
protocols. Since IE/n ≤ ǫ ∼ 2
−λ|K| needs to go down ex-
ponentially for linear bit improvement in the security of
K, it does not appear promising to try a brute-force ex-
perimental approach for increased security of either the
raw or composition kind. The criterion δE ≤ ǫ may be
used in a classical noise protocol, it provides good PKL
security but has problems simliar to IE/n for raw secu-
rity. It is not clear how its quantum generalization may
be developed and what its composition security would be
in the presence of quantum memory. In the absence of
adequate guarantee on both raw and composition secu-
rity, QKD would lose its main claim of merit over con-
ventional cryptography and would reduce in practice to
a mere “art” similar in many ways to the latter.
What can be done about it? The following four alter-
native routes may be suggested:
(i) At the expense of efficiency, it may be possible to
improve security under (3)-(4) by appropriate pri-
vacy amplification. However, privacy amplification
cannot improve p1 [9,section IIID]. Due to the small
l that can be obtained, this does not look promis-
ing for a real protocol to get l (near) uniform bits
in K from p1 ∼ 2
−l even if possible. The effec-
tive key generation rate would be reduced from r
to r′ = rl/n for an n-bit K.
(ii) One may use more efficient key generation schemes
from the KCQ approach [9] other than QKD
with intrusion level estimation. The possibility
of obtaining adequate security with such approach
against all attacks can be explored.
(iii) One may limit the security to just the more real-
istic attacks that can be launched with foreseeable
technology advance. This would rule out, in par-
ticular, joint attacks that involve actual quantum
entanglement over several or more subsystems. The
situation may then be reduced to that of a wiretap
channel [1] and one may genearte near-uniform K
with a nonvanishing final key rate [37].
(iv) One may limit the devices Eve possesses to more
realistic ones. In particular, this would exclude
long and near-perfect quantum memory and help
the composition security instantly. Devices that
are totally free of the many limits that have been
around for a long time may also be excluded. This
restriction is in addition to and independent of that
in (iii), as it concerns with device realization rather
than unknown in-principle schematic realization al-
though both can be brought under the general clas-
sification of limited technology.
Given the subtle modeling question in physical cryp-
tography and especially in BB84 type protocols, it is not
clear that (iii)-(iv) entail any loss of true security in a real
world application as compared to the inadequate levels
one may obtain in an ideal model that allows Eve all the
physical possibilities. Note that all conventional cryp-
tosystems are being currently deployed under equivalent
assumptions to (iii)-(iv) on unavailable alrogithms and
computing power, which are of a mathematical nature
instead of physical ones. It is not clear why mathemat-
ical presumptions are better than physical ones. One
may argue the contrary in some situations. The clear
advantage of physical cryptography is that it is difficult
to launch an attack or to obtain just the “ciphertext”, in
sharp contrast to conventional cryptosystems. It is possi-
ble that feature alone is enough to justify the deployment
of physical cryptosystems in some applications.
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